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Bruce L. Mouser
Continuing British Interest
in Coastal Guinea-Conakry
and Fuuta Jaloo Highlands
(1750 to 1850)
From the late eighteenth century, the British maintained a lively interest
upon the Guinea-Conakry coast and in Fuuta Jaloo which fed numerous
rivers that emptied on this coast. Commercial firms with headquarters in
Liverpool and London had maintained numerous trading relationships here
since the mid-eighteenth century, especially in the Nunez and Pongo rivers,
upon Iles de Los, and upon islands located at the mouth of the Sierra Leone
River. The firm of Barber & Bolland operated a trading factory at Iles de
Los, for example, and its principal agent, Miles Barber, developed an elabor-
ate network for supplying and merchandising European and American
products with numerous African, European, and Euro-African merchants1.
Trades in coastally produced commodities and in slaves were paramount to
the commerce of this coast.
Inevitably, however, interest was keen for the sources of more distant
products that were brought coastward from interior markets. To be sure,
every trader upon this coast perhaps dreamed about a commerce that would
link his trade to that believed to exist on the Niger River itself and bring
gold and highly sought and equally profitable goods to increase his fortune.
It was this dream, encouraged by a lucrative trade in coastal goods, that
drove British and other foreign fascination with the hinterland of Guinea-
Conakry and with the Fula peoples who ruled in the Fuuta Jaloo highlands.
Early Phase
Between 1750 and 1790, principal centers for British activity with Guinea-
Conakry were at Iles de Los, located only a few kilometers from Sangara
1. Citations are made primarily to secondary works where more particular attention
is given to specific documents. For citations for Iles de Los, see MOUSER (1996);
DEBBASCH (1988: 209-212).
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Point, and at Bance Island in the Sierra Leone River. Lesser but significant
centers were located in the Nunez, Pongo, and Scarcies rivers where several
independent, or at least marginally attached, British traders operated fac-
tories. A few Atlantic-based traders maintained factories in the Quiaport,
Bereira, and Forékariah rivers located south of Sangara peninsula. Newly
developed indigenous states in these latter rivers, however, organized trade
more directly with coasting vessels, and, in consequence, these stranger
merchants increasingly found local elites to be less friendly by 1775 to
foreign competition which might interfere with local control of commerce.
At Iles de Los, the principal Europeans resident there were British, although
an occasional French trader is mentioned in the record. Factory Town was
the largest trading establishment in the islands and perhaps along this coast,
and here Miles Barber provided Europeans visiting the coast with shipping
supplies, a doctor, craftsmen for ship repairs and for preparing vessels for
trade, numerous pilots available for hire by coasting vessels, fresh water,
and a welcome respite from unhealthy conditions present in the mangrove
and mosquito-plagued coast. Some vessels made the islands a regular desti-
nation, negotiated for cargoes to be collected coastally, and expected to be
provisioned in a timely and regular fashion. Captains and supercargoes
were seldom disappointed (Mouser 1996: 84-88). Many of the same consi-
derations were present at Bance Island, although there is no record to indi-
cate that Bance Island-based traders also repaired vessels to the degree
available at Factory Town, and it is clear that health conditions there were
far less advantageous than at Iles de Los.
These bulking centers served as magnets for ship captains in search of
quickly acquired cargo and locally established merchants. Because of the
islands’ location and ease of access, and because they warehoused goods
and provided services sought by shippers and locally-based merchants, they
were especially attractive. Representing large British-based firms, commer-
cial agents at Iles de Los could be expected to provide quality goods, servi-
ces, and repairs and to honor contracts made with shippers and local-based
merchants. It was common practice for shippers to advance goods in antici-
pation of a cargo, reach commercial agreements before any goods were
received onboard, and even to place orders for forthcoming ventures upon
the coast. Locally-established merchants, whether African, European, or
Euro-African, used these bulking centers as wholesalers of European and
American products, especially firearms and gun powder. Equally important
to local commerce and indigenous traders, however, were markets in rice
and other provisions sold to shippers for use during their transshipment of
slaves to the New World. Local merchants also could act as middlemen
between local producers of goods and providers of slaves, with the larger
commercial agents located at these points receiving an increment of profits
in the trade (Brooks 1970; Mouser 1978; Gamble 2002: 47-50).
If island traders were primarily interested in trade with ship captains
and in supplying resident traders with goods and services, merchants living
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upon the coast had slightly different objectives which drew their attention
more directly to interior suppliers of products and slaves that enriched their
fortunes. In the Rio Nunez, Fula expansion from Fuuta Jaloo by the late
eighteenth century had already established a resident governor among the
Landuma peoples who occupied the headwaters of the river where British
merchants maintained factories (McGowan 1978: 40-41, 65-66; Botte 1991:
1417-1418). Caravans came from Fuuta Jaloo and from more distant mark-
ets with commodities and slaves, and bought salt produced locally and
manufactured goods that merchants warehoused upon the coast. The con-
tact between these Nunez-based merchants and traders from the Fuuta and
beyond to the Niger River, therefore, was more immediate than that enjoyed
by those traders based at Iles de Los, with factory managers obliged to
maintain cordial relations with local landlords, caravan leaders, and a Fula
governor who resided nearby. It was also common for factory-based mer-
chants to send hawkers into the Fula-controlled interior to advertise products
and prices for African and European goods, and thereby to encourage the
collection of specific items that were in demand upon the coast, and to
entice caravan leaders to their own factories. Some merchants sent agents
as far as Labé, Timbo, and other centers, to live and report on trends present
in those markets, and, of course, to link their own fortunes to those of major
luminaries in interior markets (Watt 1994).
This was also true in the Rio Pongo, but perhaps to a lesser extent than
in the Nunez, because Fula sovereignty in the Pongo was less defined or
as evident by the end of the eighteenth century. Still, there was a Fula
governor present in the Bangalan branch of the upper Pongo, and resident
traders regularly negotiated with him as well as with prominent Susu/Baga
landlords in that region2. As in the Nunez, Pongo-based merchants were
acutely aware of the importance of maintaining friendly relations with Fula
caravan leaders and of the Nunez practice of sending representatives to
advertise goods and prices along trade paths and at major markets in Fuuta
Jaloo. At least until 1790, the Fula found it convenient in the Pongo, how-
ever, to negotiate directly with a European, John Ormond, Sr., who was
commercially and regionally more significant, at least for Fula interests,
than local headmen who seemed to have power bases restricted to a village
or small groups of villages (Watt 1994: 47r-47v, 69r, 77r; McGowan 1978:
103-105)3.
2. Primary accounts for Pongo conditions are found in AFZELIUS (1967) and MACAU-
LAY (Z. Macaulay’s diary and journals). S. SCHWARZ (2000/2002) has edited
Macaulay’s journals for the June-December 1793 period. See also MOUSER
(1973).
3. Charles Emmanuel Sorry’s interpretation of Fula interactions in the Rio Pongo
(SORRY 1973: 20-31) collapses events of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
in such a way that a precise time line fails to emerge. His narrative, which is
enlightening in the nature of Susu rule, emphasizes Susu and Fula players at the
turn of the century, perhaps reflecting accessible oral traditions linked to Kati
kingship. References from the British period before 1800 and from British
records are absent from Sorry’s reconstruction.
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British interest in the Konkouré/Dembia River region, that area between
the Pongo and Cape Sangara, was marginal at best before 1800. Here import-
ant Luso-African families had established themselves by mid-eighteenth
century, had married daughters of locally important landowners, and main-
tained a near monopoly of commerce between the interior and the coast
(Rodney 1970: 78-82; Golbéry 1802: 163-172; Mouser 1975: 429)4. These
families, principally the Gomezes and Fernandezes, interacted with British
merchants in neighboring rivers and at Iles de Los and Bance Island centers,
but they also jealously guarded their commerce from external influences
and especially from British presence in their rivers. Whether they maintai-
ned scouts along interior paths is unclear, but the fact that others followed
that commercial practice suggests that they did the same thing.
The coast south of Cape Sangara to the Melakori River was dominated,
by the last third of the eighteenth century, by developing Susu and Mand-
ingo states (Sumbuya and Moria) that nominally recognized Fula sover-
eignty on issues of ruler selection, but which otherwise guarded themselves
from any Fula military presence within their territories (Skinner 1988: 91-
113, 1980: 52-64; Howard & Skinner 1984; Mouser 1998). These Susu
and Mandingos, many of whom were Muslim or followed Muslim practices
in dress and customs, maintained relationships with the interior in a different
fashion than did those merchants who were non-Muslims or non-Africans.
It was common practice for these African merchants and rulers to send sons
to recognized schools in Labé or Timbo for a proper Muslim education,
thereby seeking to establish working relationships with the forthcoming gen-
eration of Fula elites (Mouser 1998: 241). Perhaps rulers or important line-
ages in the Nunez and Pongo did the same thing, but that fact is not noted
in official records.
Pockets of non-Muslim Susu and other ethnic groups also separated
Sumbuya and Moria from Fula-occupied territories in their hinterland, and
this helped to create a buffer between these overlords and their “subject”
coastal Muslim states. Whether these Africans followed the practice of
sending agents into the interior is unclear. The head of the powerful Dum-
buya lineage in Sumbuya reported in 1794, however, that he had traveled
to Fuuta Jaloo many times and had gone beyond it to markets on the Niger
River5. The forthcoming ruler of Moria, Alimaami Amara Morani, was sent
to Timbo/Labé in 1776 for a Koranic education and for political/commercial
purposes and would return to lead his state, often in opposition to Fula
interests that the Fula might have expected him to support (Mouser 1998:
241).
British merchants based at Bance Island in the Sierra Leone River were
less advantageously situated for trade with Fuuta Jaloo or Niger River com-
merce than were those traders located northward along the coast (Mouser
4. For more on the Fernandez family and this section of coast, see MCLACHLAN
(1999: 22-24 and notes) and GRAF (1998: 7-13 and notes).
5. MACAULAY (Z. Macaulay’s 1794 Journal: entry dated 10 April 1794).
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1996; McGowan 1990). Indeed, the greater percentage of goods and mark-
ets arriving at Bance Island came from immediate ethnic neighbors, the
Temne and Mende. Some Niger River and Fuuta Jaloo items reached the
Bance Island market, but paths between this island and the Fuuta highlands
were frequently disrupted by interior ethnic and land disputes. The more
frequent path for Fuuta goods came via coasting trade carried by canoes
from Sumbuya and Moria or from independent European and African mer-
chants in the Nunez, Pongo, or Konkouré rivers who were scouting bulking
centers for more advantageous prices or from those who effectively were
agents of Bance Island merchants (Mouser 1998: 222-226; McGowan 1990:
27; Howard & Skinner 1984; Skinner 1978: 37-40). Still, the lure of Fuuta
Jaloo and interior commerce was high here as well. The dream of opening
secure paths into Fuuta and beyond through Port Loko and through Limba
and interior Susu and Jallonke peoples remained throughout the century.
Sierra Leone Company Interest
Two events of the late 1780s helped to transform British interest in this
region, however, and brought with them significant changes. In 1787, Brit-
ish philanthropic interests in London negotiated an agreement with Temne
and Bullom landowners at the mouth of the Sierra Leone River for a settle-
ment for “returning” persons of African descent from British territories
(Mouser 1979: 8-13; Peterson 1969: 20-27; Fyfe 1962: 15-26; Wilson 1980:
52-53; Jakobsson 1972: 46-53; Braidwood 1994: chaps 3-5). At about the
same time, the principal trading agent on Factory Island, Miles Barber, deci-
ded to retire, to settle his commercial and relational accounts upon the coast,
and to turn his physical property over to the firm of Richard Horrocks/
Jackson (Clarkson 1927: 93). The initial British settlement of 1787-1789,
later termed the “Providence of Freedom”, failed from a combination of
poor planning, unfortunate timing, and unforeseen circumstances. The
settlement was essentially rescued, however, by the establishment of a com-
mercial venture, the Sierra Leone Company, which assumed some of the
former sponsors’ objectives but added to them both a requirement to seek
a profitable return for Company investors and a desire to champion a goal
of ending slave commerce and expanding British commerce in its place
(Fyfe 1962: 26ff; Wilson 1980: 53-56). This meant that, if profit was to
be a requirement for success, a “Company” settlement at the mouth of the
Sierra Leone River was perhaps not in the most advantageous place. Maybe
it should have been located further north where important trade paths were
already operating and trade was more lucrative. Indeed, in 1792, when
Richard Horrocks at Iles de Los indicated an interest in selling his invest-
ment because of poor health, an agent of the Sierra Leone Company com-
menced never-completed negotiations for the islands’ transfer to Company
control (Clarkson 1927: 12). Clearly some Company agents, by 1792,
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recognized that the Company’s commercial interests upon this coast might
be better served if its center were more centrally located upon the Guinea-
Conakry coast, not on that of Sierra Leone6.
Surviving records from the Company period of Sierra Leone history
(1789-1808) make it clear that the Company became concerned quickly that
its so-called “Northern Rivers” and the Fuuta Jaloo/Niger River were areas
where the Company’s fortune would be made. Discussion of an illusive
Port Loko path that would connect Freetown with the Fuuta/Niger is ever-
present in surviving company-related documents. It is also clear that there
was some sentiment among Fula leaders within Fuuta Jaloo that the Fula
also wanted a secure and open path to Freetown, and one that would bypass
troublesome relations that characterized paths through Sumbuya and Moria
or through slave traders who operated out of Port Loko, or through British
traders in the Rio Nunez or Rio Pongo. Certainly the Fula were powerful
enough to force an alternative path to the coast, but the Fula also traded in
slaves in exchange for firearms and gunpowder, a practice that the Company
seemed intent upon ending. Fula leaders also wanted to maintain for them-
selves whatever economic advantage that might accrue through cooperation
with existing lucrative slave marts in those other regions (McGowan 1978:
81-84, 105-112, 120).
By 1793, Company officials and Fula representatives had met often
enough to agree that a Company representative would travel overland to
Timbo and would establish some sort of formal relationship between their
two groups. James Watt and Matthew Winterbottom would conduct an
expedition to Timbo from factories located in the Rio Nunez, and Watt
would open direct talks perhaps leading to a company factory/agent in the
capital of the Fula state itself, or at least discuss future ventures between
the interior (Fuuta and beyond) and the British company7. Coincidental to
this expedition which lasted for more than four months was another Com-
pany objective—to establish a company factory in the Rio Pongo where the
death of John Ormond, Sr., had led to a vacuum of leadership among rival
traders (Mouser 1973: 50ff.). In 1794 Watt met with Alimaami Sadu while
in Timbo, found the Fula ruler interested in hosting European settlers/traders
in his territory, discussed the possibilities of factories at Timbo or at the
Rio Pongo and at Port Loko, and returned with a group of Fula representa-
tives who had been directed to resume talks with Company officials at Free-
town. At least one of these representatives remained at Freetown for nearly
a year, and during that time the Company established its sought Fula link
6. It is unclear whether Captain Philip Beaver’s British settlement in 1792 at Bul-
ama, near the mouth of the Rio Grande in Guinea-Bissao, was a part of this
northern perspective. It is clear, however, that Beaver was convinced that a
British enclave at Bulama could easily tap into interior commerce through linka-
ges to existing trade. For more on Bulama, see BEAVER (1968).
7. MCGOWAN (1990: 28); MACAULAY (Z. Macaulay’s 1793 Journal: entries dated
30 June, 10, 12, 27 September 1793); WATT (1994).
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through a new factory planted at Freeport/Tokekerren near the capital of
the Bangu/Bangura lineage and residence of the Fula governor in the Rio
Pongo (ibid.; Watt 1994: 81v)8. Talks between the Fula and British contin-
ued about a possible overland path via Port Loko that would bypass Moria
and Sumbuya, but opposition within the latter states to any plan to circum-
vent their controls of existing paths and opposition of other ethnic groups
who opposed any possibility of a large number of armed Fula crossing their
territories was sufficient to keep such a path from developing, without a
direct enforcement with a Fula military force.
The Company’s venture at Freeport in the Rio Pongo lasted from 1794
to 1802, but that enterprise failed for several reasons9. This was a decade
of war in Europe, and delivery of British manufactured goods to West Africa
and Freeport was a continuing and frustrating problem. French privateers
also plagued shipping along this coast, and many Company vessels were
seized by any captain who might seek advantage from the war, whether
actual combatants or not. Company agents assigned at Freeport and their
own policy of refusing to buy slaves did not serve Company objectives well
either. Agents did hire local Africans in their business and sent hawkers
into the interior to advertise prices and goods, but at least one agent at
Freeport refused to provide Fula caravan leaders with customary hospitality
when they reached the coast (Afzelius 1967: 103, 109, 113). Those traders
within the rivers who bought slaves, ivory, and other inland commodities
quickly learned that they could refuse to purchase a caravan’s slaves if ivory
and other products were sold first to Company agents. Although some
caravans clearly had been directed to trade only with the Company in fulfill-
ment of some agreement between Company and Fula representatives at Free-
town, many caravan leaders found upon reaching the coast that it was
possible and to their advantage to avoid the Company store and their agree-
ments completely10. The conundrum for both the Fula and the British was
the symbiotic relationship of commodities and slave trades and the inability
of the Company to receive a majority of non-slave goods reaching the
coast. This problem was never resolved, although both groups continued
to seek a solution into the mid-nineteenth century.
Perhaps another mitigating factor in Freeport’s commercial failure was
the presence of lucrative and secure canoe trades that were developing in
the same period between Sumbuya/Moria and Freetown. At the same time
as the British initiative at Freeport, Dumbuya lineage interests from Sum-
buya was attempting, for example, to expand its own network of canoe trade
to the outskirts of the Freetown settlement, and Mori Kanu was establishing
a competing network linking markets in Maligia/Melakori of Moria with
8. See also PUBLIC RECORDS OFFICE (PRO), CO270/2, Council, 5 May 1794.
9. MOUSER (1973); MACAULAY (Z. Macaulay’s 1797 Diary: entry dated 7 June 1797)
10. AFZELIUS (1967: 113); PRO CO270/3, 3 February 1796 and CO270/4, 26 April
1796; MOUSER (1980: 507).
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the settlement as well (Mouser 1998: 222-226; Howard & Skinner 1984:
4-10, 19; Howard 1972: 92-93). Sumbuya produced large surpluses of
white polished rice that was in high demand at Freetown, and all towns in
the Northern Rivers transshipped cattle that had been marched to the coast.
These were shipped further south by canoes and other vessels. This trade
in foodstuffs, always necessary to Freetown, meant that Freetown became
less and less reliant upon its Freeport connection for consumables and for
hides, ivory, and other goods from the interior. Canoes also carried rice
and other goods southward from the Nunez and Pongo, if prices were more
advantageous at the Freetown market11.
One fascinating and troublesome chapter in this early period involved
the unexpected consequences of Alimaami Sadu’s supposed promise to
James Watt to provide British settlers with land at Timbo if they came into
his territory (Sierra Leone Company 1794: 141)12. This promise of land,
and seemingly of protection, was widely published in the evangelical press
in Britain and generated there an enthusiastic response within a number of
religious missionary societies that believed that the Company would sponsor
and welcome missionaries at Freetown and that Sadu’s offer somehow had
offered religious tolerance and protection within Fuuta Jaloo. A number
of missionaries and supplies for anticipated farms in the Fuuta highlands
arrived at Freetown, somewhat bewildering Company officials.13 In the
1790s, some Company officials apparently believed that the Fula were not
opposed to Christian settlers in Fuuta Jaloo and that their presence there
might transform the interior and lead to commerce in merchandise rather
than slaves. By 1806, however, nearly all Company officials knew that
Christian schools, missions, or settlers would not be welcome in Muslim
Sumbuya, Moria, or Fuuta Jaloo14. The Company dilemma was to find a
way to encourage development of schools at Freetown and in the Northern
Rivers without endangering whatever trade the Company enjoyed in these
northern markets15. Consideration of building schools in these areas was
11. BRIGHT (1979: entry dated 18 October 1802).
12. It is interesting that this same promise does not appear in Watt’s Journal.
13. For 1795-1805 missionary ventures, see JAKOBSSON (1972: 104-118); WALKER
(1845: 171-190); Missionary Records: West Africa (1836: 68-72); HAIR (1965:
38-40).
14. Church Missionary Society (CMS) Records, CA1/E1/46, Freetown, Corresponding
Committee to P. Hartwig, 9 April 1806.
15. According to GRAY (1940: 287-290), an elaborate scheme for exploring the
interior was recommended by Colonel Charles Stevenson in 1804. This plan
consisted of four expeditionary groups, all of which would be comprised of mili-
tary personnel and which would enter west Africa along different paths. One
of these would follow the route used by Watt/Winterbottom in 1794 through the
Fuuta Jaloo and would be led by Captain Philip Beaver who in 1792 had failed
in his attempt to establish the British settlement upon Bulama Island. Steven-
son’s scheme placed its emphasis upon making commercial contacts with Niger-
based merchants, opening the Niger to British commerce, and transforming com-
merce to legitimate goods rather than slaves. While Stevenson’s proposal
received an enthusiastic initial reception in London, a study of projected costs
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finally abandoned in 1805/1806, but that came only after the election of
Amara as Alimaami of Moria, who opposed Christian missionaries within
his state, and after the expulsion of Dala Modu Dumbuya from Freetown
in the same year16.
Investors and contributors who supported the ending of the slave trade
and British commercial expansion upon the continent were placated, instead,
by an ill-advised missionary effort in the Rio Pongo where two teachers/
catechists from the Edinburgh Missionary Society were placed briefly in
1798-1800 and where schools and missions were maintained by the Church
Missionary Society between 1808 and 1816/1817 (Walker 1845: 220-513;
Jakobsson 1972: 131-166). Muslim influence in the Rio Pongo region was
expanding, but at that time it was not yet strong enough to openly oppose
Christian proponents. A rivalry between landowners and European/African/
Euro-African traders encouraged the missionaries for a time, but nearly all
of these considered missionary schools as advantageous to trade and to their
own future only as long as teachers did not openly oppose the slave trade
(Mouser 1971: 83-129).
British Colonial Interest
In 1808, two additional events helped to transform British objectives along
this coast even further. By that date, the Company was experiencing serious
financial difficulties, partly a result of poor administration, poor accounting
practices, and corruption, but equally important was the fact that slave trad-
ing was still legal for nearly all Europeans upon the coast. Company advo-
cates in Parliament heatedly supported a governmental assumption of Company
responsibilities at the Sierra Leone settlement, and, after much debate within
Parliament, a law was passed ending Company liabilities and transforming
the settlement into a royal colony17. Although transfer from Company to
Colony meant that many of the same people remained in important positions
at Freetown, this transfer did mean that the British government would be
expected to enforce its national laws and could bring its navy and regiments
into the region in a more aggressive manner than when under Company control.
reduced the scheme to a single expedition—that of Mungo Park through the
Gambia River in 1805. Nevertheless, planning must have involved many at
Sierra Leone and along the coast who certainly would have envisioned expedi-
tionary successes as expanding British influence and commerce along Africa’s
western coast.
16. See MOUSER (1998); CMS CA1/E1/89, Sierra Leone, Ludlam to Pratt, 20 Decem-
ber 1806.
17. JOHNSON (1957: 31-34); FYFE (1962: 105); J. P. Thompson Papers, folio DTH/
1/2, Macaulay to Ludlam, 28 August 1807, Manuscript Collection, Hull Univer-
sity Library, Hull University, United Kingdom. For a brief summary of this
period of transition, see HAIR (1967: 152-160).
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British policy would also change from one that focused upon Company
objectives to one that adhered to imperial government-sanctioned goals.
The second event of significance was the Parliamentary passage of a
law that forbade the transportation of slaves from Africa to the New World
by British subjects after 1 January 1808 (Fyfe 1962: 105-106; Johnson 1957:
38-44)18. These two events, especially the ending of the legal slave trade,
temporarily brought slaving to a near halt in the Northern Rivers, with some
European slave traders retiring and others changing to less hazardous com-
merce. Those who remained on the coast came increasingly under the
watchful eyes of governmental agents at Freetown or officers of Royal
Squadron vessels who were charged to enforce these new laws and protect
British subjects (traders as well as missionaries) upon the coast. This incre-
ased vigilance and interference, and raids against slave traders ordered by
Governor Charles Maxwell in 1814, further weakened whatever support
missionaries might have enjoyed earlier and lessened a British resolve to
protect missionaries in the Rio Pongo, especially when it became clear that
they were needed at Freetown to help transform cargoes of slaves captured
and released at the British settlement into obedient British subjects and to
serve imperial objectives. By 1816, most Pongo-based missionaries were
in agreement that the missions should be moved to Freetown where they
could be protected from slave traders and from troublesome landlords who
continued to be dissatisfied with commercial and political problems that
had been caused as a consequence of their presence in the river. By 1816/
1817 all missionary efforts in the Pongo had ended19.
The official ending of the slave trade in 1808, however, influenced more
than just the missionaries and the slave traders. The premise that the North-
ern Rivers’ commerce (including that between the Fuuta and the coast) could
be transformed from one principally in slaves to one in commodities contin-
ued to infatuate British officials at Freetown. And, again recognizing per-
haps that the mouth of the Sierra Leone River had been a poor choice for
an enterprising and successful settlement, officials sought to expand the
colony northward in the second decade of the nineteenth century. Beaver’s
ill-fated settlement upon Bulama Island in 1792-1793 was now copiously
discussed in government correspondence, and considerations were given
once again to restoring treaty stipulations that Beaver had obtained with
local landlords on that island (Beaver 1968; Hair 1997; Brooks 1996: 148-
156). A believed interest by American commercial firms in purchasing Iles
de Los in 1818 led, moreover, to an formal agreement reached between
British officials and Baga/Susu landlords on the islands and on the neighbor-
ing shore of Sumbuya and Kalum for formal cession of the islands to Britain.
An enthusiastic governor of Sierra Leone promptly suggested renaming all
18. See also Laws of Sierra Leone (1808).
19. JAKOBSSON (1972: 146-149, 151-154, 160-169, 177-187); CMS CA1/E5A/91,
Wilhelm to Pratt, 21 April 1817.
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the islands and in renaming its colony centered at Freetown to “Sierra Leone
and the Iles de Los”, perhaps anticipating an addition of Bulama Island at
a later date20. Clearly some at Freetown wanted a northern colonial expan-
sion, effectively creating three centers of British commercial and political
influence—Freetown, Iles de Los, and Bulama Island, all important for
establishing a British sphere within the region. Some directly suggested
that the slave trade and trades from rival American competitors could be
quashed completely by military detachments stationed at the mouths of stra-
tegic rivers and at the Ile Tombo at the tip of Cape Sangara, where Conakry
is now located21.
Coinciding with this Northern initiative were at least three expeditions
launched into the interior highlands to bring Fula suppliers and Niger-based
commerce more directly into this new envisioned sphere. In January 1814,
Governor Maxwell sent then Sergeant William Tuft of the 3rd West India
Regiment (Royal African Corps) on a successful mission to Timbo via Port
Loko. Tuft was a “man of colour”22 and “native of this [Kukuna] Country”
(O’Beirne 1979: 33). Maxwell directed Tuft to assure Fula authorities of
the Colony’s continued friendship and to obtain agreement for opening “an
unrestrained communication” between Timbo and Freetown via Kukuna or
Port Loko23. A year later a group of fifty-five colonial representatives (with
more than 100 well-armed persons in the party and 200 animals) arrived
in the Rio Nunez to repeat Watt’s experience of 1793-1794, to traverse
Fuuta Jaloo to the Niger River where the expedition was directed to chart
its course to where it emptied into an ocean, lake or stream, to discover
the truth about Mongo Park’s fate and possibly return his physical remains,
and to open the interior of west Africa to British commerce. This grand
expedition of 1815-1817, led by Brevet-Major John Peddie, Captain Thomas
Campbell, and Lt. Stokoe lasted for more than a year, and, although it was
the largest of its kind to that date, it failed to obtain its objectives because
of illnesses and deaths and because of opposition from Fula elites who were
then planning a military expedition of their own and who questioned the
expedition’s and British objectives at each stage. The fact that the expedi-
tion envisioned an opening of interior commerce more directly to Britain
was not lost upon the Fula who could clearly see that such success would
diminish their own control of commerce crossing Fuuta Jaloo and would
20. PRO CO267/47/156, MacCarthy to Bathurst, 20 July 1818, and enclosure; Royal
Gazette and Sierra Leone Advertiser (RGSLA), 25 July 1818.
21. PRO CO267/47/156, MacCarthy to Bathurst, 20 July 1818; MCLACHLAN (1999:
29).
22. RGSLA, 8 September 1821; MCGOWAN (1990: 34).
23. RGSLA, 13 October 1821; GRAY & DOCHARD (1825: 12). According to Gray,
Maxwell had used Tuft as a messenger to African rulers on several occasions.
See The African Herald, 21 January 1809, for an earlier invitation from Timbo
that an officer be sent from Freetown to meet with the Fula ruler. Later, Tuft
was described as holding the rank of Lieutenant, perhaps a consequence of this
request that Freetown’s representative be an “officer”.
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likely strengthen traditional enemies upon their borders. British opposition
to slave trading and British raids upon slave trading factories in the Rio
Pongo where several Fula were killed also led to questions about British
claims that it was requesting only a peaceful crossing of Fula territory.
The expedition, despite its failure, however, did demonstrate a continuing
and significant British investment in this region’s future and declared British
interest in linking Fula traders and Fula officials to those of the coast.
Sergeant Tuft also accompanied the Peddie/Campbell expedition, and he
twice visited Timbo via the Nunez Path in 1816, certainly making him the
most experienced colonial representative at that time to visit Fuuta Jaloo24.
The failure of such a large expedition was followed by a regrouping of
its survivors at Freetown and a restructuring of its objectives. Lt. Stokoe
assumed command during the 1817 rainy season and with a small party
proceeded to Forékariah in Moria from which they would move into the
interior. Stokoe expected to negotiate agreements with powerful landlords
along the path to Timbo and to collectively open a new path to Freetown.
Moria officials opposed such a move, however, for it might diminish their
influence in this commerce. Stokoe ignored these protects and began his
march inward, only to discover that he had no protector and that without
that protection those along the path engaged him in endless negotiations
and palavers. Stokoe, like Campbell before him, returned to the coast with-
out reaching Timbo. Officials at Freetown now decided that any attempt
to cross Fuuta Jaloo would be opposed by the Fula, and they resolved to
continue the expedition to explore the Niger, but through another port.
Major William Gray accepted command of the exploratory troop, and the
remaining expedition sailed for the Gambia River which would then serve
as its entry point into the continent (Gray & Dochard 1825: 36-43)25.
These setbacks in 1814-1817 did not deter British efforts, however.
While Watt had demonstrated that a path to Fuuta Jaloo through the Rio
Nunez was possible, it was accepted wisdom that the failed attempts of
1814-1817 had suffered from a string of unforeseen circumstances. It was
24. The only published report of the Peddie/Campbell expedition is found in GRAY
& DOCHARD (1825: chaps 3-13) which covers the successful expedition through
the Gambia to Segu and Kaarta. The first two chapters, however, describe the
ill-fated Nunez expedition, before Gray took charge. According to Dochard,
likely author of the first part of Travels in Western Africa, the Nunez path was
used because of a strong recommendation from Freetown officials. Adolphus
Kummer, German naturalist, and a Mr. Partarrieau of Senegal joined the large
expedition. Fever struck the group almost at the moment it landed in the Nunez
River. DOCHARD (1825: 11-12), wrote that the Timbo ruler had specifically
requested that a white officer be sent to Timbo to explain the expedition’s pur-
pose, but that Campbell believed it not “requisite” to send an officer and instead
sent Tuft. The complete record of this expedition is found in PRO CO2/5, “Mis-
sion to Explore the Interior of Africa, 1815-1817”, currently being edited by the
author. For Tuft, see RGSLA,, 3 February 1821.
25. For Stokoe’s failed attempt via Port Loko, see RGSLA, 8 September 1821,
13 October 1821.
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also known at Freetown that a similar road into the interior existed through
the Rio Pongo. William Lawrence, a principal Euro-African trader resident
at Domingia in the Rio Pongo, was married to a sister of a prominent Fula
leader and had traveled frequently to Timbo along this path26. Lawrence
was also admired at Freetown, even to the point that his father had attempted
to buy property within the settlement, and William had sent children to
Freetown for education after missionaries closed their Pongo-based schools
in 181727. Infrequent Fula caravans also reached Freetown itself as did
Muslim teachers who established Koranic schools in the settlement’s out-
skirts and among neighboring ethnic groups28. Caravans generally brought
embassies from Fula rulers whose objectives were to further talks on the
potential of a new secure path through Port Loko. Their presence and
discussions of mutual advantages encouraged further British attempts to
reach Timbo and to further clarify conditions existing between Timbo and
Freetown29.
By 1820 Freetown officials were reasonably satisfied that legitimate
commerce from the Guinea-Conakry coast and along paths between Timbo
and the Nunez and Pongo rivers would ultimately add to British fortunes
and Freetown’s commercial improvement. Watt in 1794, and to a degree
Campbell in 1814/1817, had proven the Nunez path to be firmly under Fula
control. Gaspard Mollien, traveling overland from Senegal to Timbo in
1818, confirmed Campbell’s reports that paths joining Timbo to more dis-
tant interior markets were open and flourishing30. The Pongo path was also
believed to be open generally to trade31. With Iles de Los under British
rule as of 1818, and assuming that legitimate commodities would eventually
replace the slave trade, British profits and share of coastal commerce would
certainly increase.
In the 1820s alone, three expeditions to Timbo were launched from Free-
town. To be sure, all occurred as a consequence of timely circumstances
and immediate questions at Freetown that needed to be resolved or answered.
But all continued to demonstrate a preeminent British interest in an evasive
Freetown-Timbo connection. The remaining path, and that one which in
1820 was closed frequently by coastal warfare/intrigue/interference, led
from Freetown to Timbo via Port Loko and Kukuna on the Scarcies River.
When a letter arrived late in 1820 from Timbo, suggesting that the path
between Timbo and Freetown via Port Loko be reformed and identified as
26. RGSLA, 13 October 1821, 3 August 1822.
27. PRO, CO270/4, Council, 22 July 1799; MACAULAY (Z. Macaulay’s 1793/94 Diary,
entry dated 2 April 1794.
28. For Muslim clerics near Freetown, see SKINNER (1978, 1988).
29. PRO, Colonial Office Series 271, contains numerous issues of the RGSLA. By
1820, frequent references appear in the gazette of Fula missions or inland traders
in Freetown.
30. MOLLIEN (1967); RGSLA, 9 December 1820.
31. RGSLA, 30 December 1820.
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being “without any intermediate agency”, Freetown officials shifted their
attention to establishing a more direct link with Timbo32. In 1814 Tuft had
demonstrated that one could travel directly to Timbo via Port Loko, but
Stokoe had failed in his 1817 attempt. Countless Fula and more interior-
based traders, teachers, and spokesmen, meanwhile, had traveled along this
Port Loko path or at least succeeded in reaching Freetown without resorting
to coastal canoe carriers. A “correspondent” at Freetown in December
1820, likely reflecting official opinion, suggested a simplistic two-step
process for securing Freetown’s future commercial prosperity along the
Scarcies/Fuuta corridor: 1) establish an open road to Timbo, and 2) connect
interior paths between Timbo and Niger-based paths33.
In January 1821, Governor MacCarthy directed Assistant Staff Surgeon
Brian O’Beirne of the Royal African Corps to travel along a Tuft-similar
trail into the interior and to discuss at Timbo the possibility of opening a
secure new path34. O’Beirne’s descriptions of ethnic differences and politi-
cal realities in the Scarcies River and in Sulima/Tambuca/Fuuta regions
are particularly instructive, clearly demonstrating that British officials were
concerned about those peoples and states located along this projected path
and were conscious of the necessity to reach some agreement with them if
a secure and southern path to Timbo and beyond were ever to be estab-
lished. Joining O’Beirne on his return from Timbo to Freetown was Setafa,
messenger from the ruler of Segu, with a letter addressed to the governor
of Sierra Leone. Setafa’s arrival at Freetown in mid-1821 injected a new
immediacy and excitement into discussions about the thus-far illusive path
and the possibility of establishing a more distant Niger connection35. Mean-
while MacCarthy asked Assistant Staff Surgeon Peter McLachlan of the
2nd West India Regiment, Royal Africa Corps, to produce a report that would
describe the peoples of the coast neighboring Iles de Los (McLachlan
1999)36. Clearly MacCarthy, and his administration at Freetown, had rea-
son to believe that the entire region was slipping more firmly into a British
sphere of commerce, and he wanted as much information about peoples,
leaders, and customary practices as could be obtained.
32. RGSLA, 9 December 1820. In RGSLA, 10 February 1821, the writer suggested that
the recent death of Brimah at Port Loko made a Port Loko path to Timbo more
possible. MCGOWAN (1990) suggested that British interest in interior commerce
was sporadic and depended much upon the personality of each governor. Fula
interest in a direct connection with Freetown also depended upon interior political
conditions and upon circumstances prevailing within optional routes to the coast.
See also Howard (1972: 140-141).
33. RGSLA, 9 December 1820; SKINNER & SKINNER (n.d.: 2-4); MCGOWAN (1978:
145-146).
34. O’BEIRNE (1979: 137-280); RGSLA, 24 February 1821.
35. RGSLA, 14 April 1821, 16 June 1821, 7 July 1821, 8 September 1821, 3 August
1822, 19 August 1822; MCGOWAN (1990: 40).
36. McLachlan’s report was serialized in the RGSLA and was published in book form
in Freetown by J. Mitton in 1821.
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Discussions held between British and Fula officials at Timbo and in
Freetown in 1821 apparently failed, however, to resolve continuing differen-
ces among ethnic and political interests along the proposed path’s course.
It was these differences late in 1821 that closed the path at Kukuna to a
large Fula caravan that was led by the Alimaami’s nephew, and this act
forced Freetown to adopt a more realistic and systematic plan for path devel-
opment37. Perhaps in consequence of a perceived failure in 1821 to con-
sider the complex nature of coastal concerns respecting paths, Governor
MacCarthy sent Captain Alexander Gordon Laing, 2nd West India Regiment,
inland on three occasions in 1822 to meet with principal landlords and
rulers. Laing’s first two ventures in January and February were to Moria
near the coast to resolve lingering disagreements which surrounded the halt-
ing of the Fula caravan in 1821 and perhaps to soothe Moria’s concern that
Freetown and Timbo might be attempting to bypass Moria caravan terminals
completely or to formalize a path that would disregard long-established trad-
ing relations (Laing 1825). From 16 April to 29 October 1822, Laing con-
ducted an expedition to Sulima, during which time he met with numerous
notables along the path and prepared the way for future commerce. Laing
also was planning a fourth trip for early in 1823 that would take him to
Timbo and complete the task given him in 1822. The latter was not begun,
however, because of an outbreak of war on the Gold Coast that demanded
Laing’s attention elsewhere. By 1825, however, a direct path between the
mouth of the Scarcies River and Timbo had been opened by Tikade Modu
and Fatima Brima of Magbele who had gone to Timbo after Laing’s expedi-
tion to Sulima (ibid.: 29-30; Barry 1988: 222-223)38. Laing’s 1822 expedi-
tion to the interior was the last fully funded by the Crown until mid-century.
Lesser recorded in the 1820s is British involvement in the 1827 expedi-
tion led by René Caillié. Caillié had sought but failed to obtain backing
first from French officials at St. Louis (Caillié 1830: 140-142). According
to Caillié (ibid.: 145-149), he then traveled to Freetown where Governor
Charles Turner also rejected his proposal, partly because its success could
have meant that Caillié would have reached Timbuctoo before Major
Laing’s expedition arrived there. A more plausible objection to Caillié’s
plan perhaps derived from his proposal to proceed inland through the Nunez,
along a path already assumed to be open and operating smoothly, and along
one that did not need to be rediscovered.
37. RGSLA, 13 October 1821, 3 November 1821, 23 November 1822, 22 February
1823.
38. For increased trade between Timbo and Freetown for 1824-1825, see PRO CO267/
60/6, Hamilton to Bathurst, 21 April 1824, and enclosures, and CO267/65/26,
Turner to Bathurst, 25 June 1825. See MCGOWAN (1978: 155-187) for extensive
analysis of reasons for declining trade along the Port Loko path after Abdulkadr’s
death in 1825.
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American Initiative
Another issue for Turner and successor governors in the late 1820s and
early 1830s was a renewed initiative by American commercial and colonial
interests along this section of coast. Many of Freetown’s own settlers were
of American descent, having come from former British colonies that had
obtained independence at the end of the eighteenth century. The long Euro-
pean war of 1793-1815, an American Embargo, and a short-lived war
between the United States and Britain in 1812 had resulted in a hiatus of
American activity on the African coast (Brooks 1970: 52-65, chaps 3, 4).
A trade in now-illegal slaves and in commodities revived dramatically in
the latter half of the second decade of the nineteenth century. As in Britain,
sentiment in the United States was strong for abolition of slavery. Some
in the American South and North who opposed slavery, but who also
objected to freed slaves residing in their states, wanted to return freed slaves
to Africa or at least to transport them away from their states. These senti-
ments toward both abolition and resettlement/emigration led to increased
pressures in America to re-settle free or freed persons of African descent
along the African coast (Harper 1818).
Although this paper focuses more directly on British interest in the coast
and interior of Guinea-Conakry, it is instructive to summarize here Ameri-
can activities and objectives in the 1820s and 1830s as a way to better
understand British actions in the Northern Rivers. Numerous traders resi-
dent in the Nunez and Pongo rivers were Americans or of American descent,
and they maintained valuable contacts with American commercial firms
from the late eighteenth century. John Frazer of Bangalan branch in the
Rio Pongo, for example, operated a factory from the 1790s from which he
shipped commodities and slaves, some of the latter destined no doubt for
a rice plantation that he owned near Charleston in the state of South Carolina
(Schafer 1999). He married in the Pongo, sired a number of Euro-African
children many of whom attended the short-lived missionary schools located
there, and sent at least two children for finishing education in England and
France. When the slave trade became illegal for American citizens in 1808,
Frazer returned to Charleston and subsequently moved his plantation, as did
others, from South Carolina to Spanish Florida where slave trading remained
legal. He also took up Spanish citizenship to better protect him in the
trade. Meanwhile, his African wife and children remained in the Rio Pongo
where they operated the African base of his commercial network. Others
in the Nunez and Pongo trades or with connections at Charleston did the
same thing in an attempt to avoid application of laws designed to stop
slaving by British and American subjects. American documents clearly
demonstrate that traders in the Nunez and Pongo with strong American
connections included William and Elizabeth (Frazer) Skelton, John Sergent,
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John/Samuel Holeman, Paul Faber, Styles Lightburn, the Curtis family/
lineage, and of course the Frazers39.
There is a fleeting reference in the record of a proposal from landlords
and traders in the Rio Pongo for establishing a settlement of skilled African-
Americans in the Rio Pongo in 1820 (Gurley 1969: 349)40. That proposal,
however, apparently failed to reach American planners or was never acted
upon. Between 1820 and 1823, conditions along the coast continued to
change rapidly, and Britain became increasingly concerned that persisting
American interest in the Northern Rivers might actually result in an estab-
lishment of American colonies both north and south of Sierra Leone. Such
settlements might effectively surround the Freetown settlement with an
American economic sphere. For Americans to move forcefully into north-
ern markets also would place American competitors in a more advantageous
position in the Nunez and Pongo paths than that formally claimed by Brit-
ain. It was perhaps partly a consequence of these American initiatives or
believed initiatives that led British officials in the mid-1820s to increase
its policy of negotiating directly with neighboring landlords and of signing
formal treaties that recognized a British preeminence along this coast.
While British agreements with landlords and American failure to reach
agreements with landlords in the Northern Rivers may have temporarily
moderated British fears of American encirclement, these concerns remained
and returned as a major topic of discussion at Freetown in the early 1830s.
American interests in Baltimore, New York, and Boston declared an inten-
tion to establish a grander “Americo-African Nation”, one that would
include the Cape Verde Islands, Bulama, and Rio Pongo, and the already
established American settlements on the coast south of Freetown which soon
would be called Liberia (American Colonization Society 1828a: 325-336,
1828b: 7-13; Hair 1997: 186-187; Brooks 1973, 1996: 156-161). This pro-
posal was formally presented in 1828 to the American Colonization Society,
the principal agency of American settlement along the African coast. Sup-
port for such a scheme came from numerous groups. American evangeli-
cals were fascinated by the prospect of rapid Christian expansion upon the
continent. Those interested primarily in commercial advantages recognized
those paths from the Rio Grande, Rio Nunez, and Rio Pongo as being signifi-
cant, as certainly leading to a connection with the Fula state and trade and
perhaps to direct commerce with the lucrative Niger region. Emigrationists
wanted more locations upon the African coast to which they could export
a growing population of freed slaves. Abolitionists saw the scheme as
a way to win support from Southern contributors/sponsors for the freeing
of slaves, especially if those freed were forced to leave the South for a
39. See Papers of Jesse Tyson and Sons, MS 2371, Box VII, folio Fidelity, Maryland
Historical Society, Manuscript, Baltimore, Maryland.
40. For recent treatment of American activities in the 1820s, see MOUSER (1995,
2000).
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reclaimed homeland in Africa. A sponsor from Baltimore was so enthusi-
astic about the plan that he commissioned an unsuccessful expedition whose
purpose was to travel overland from Cape Mesurado into the interior via
Timbo, perhaps envisioning an American-Fula connection similar to that
long-sought by the British (Semmes 1917: 140-141).
This grand American scheme, which certainly would have challenged
Britain’s position on this coast had it succeeded, obtained its final and
unsuccessful encouragement when a person named Abd al-Rahman Ibrahima
became an willing participant in the plan. Ibrahima claimed to be the son
of Alimaami Ibrahima Sori of Timbo and to have been taken prisoner during
a failed Fula expedition against the Hubu (Heboh) peoples of the upper
Pongo in 1778. By his own account, he had been sold to a slaver in the
Gambia River and eventually had become the property of a plantation owner
in the State of Mississippi for more than 40 years (Alford 1977: 9, 12-16,
21-29, 39-43, 55-62). His claims of royal lineage links in Fuuta Jaloo
became widely known only in the 1830s. He consequently became the
focus of intense attention among abolitionists, emigrationists, and potential
African investors who saw him perhaps as being the valuable link between
American objectives and Fula elites at Timbo. Even evangelicals became
convinced that he had converted to Christianity and that Ibrahima would
help to spread this new faith among his ethnic brothers. Freed from slavery
at the formal request of President John Quincy Adams, Ibrahima and his
wife returned to the African coast in 1835, unfortunately during the rainy
season and with few resources sent along to support them through these
difficult months. With a Fula ambassadorial expedition approaching the
coast to meet him, he died before they arrived, and the American dream
of a vast nation vanished with his death (ibid.: 175-184).
Final Phase
British interest in Guinea-Conakry continued into the 1840s, but perhaps
to a lesser degree than earlier. Improved relations with Freetown’s neigh-
bors and further change in trade paths in its immediate hinterland boosted
the colony’s economy and lessened the relative importance of its trade with
the Northern Rivers. The slave trade declined in importance to the Northern
Rivers’ economies, and production of commodities increased as former
slave traders and landlords expanded plantations that produced groundnuts,
coffee, and other goods for world markets. Slaves perhaps formerly desti-
ned for export increasingly filled labor requirements on these plantations,
with some traders and landlords reportedly owning thousands of slaves.
Commodities produced on these plantations enriched the British economy
and the fortunes of Freetown-based merchants. British firms established a
foothold at Iles de Los and in the timber and emerging groundnut and coffee
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trades in the Melakori region and maintained important links with commodi-
ties trades in the Nunez, Pongo, and Konkouré/Dembia rivers and with Afri-
can traders/landlords in rivers south of Cape Sangara. As long as slave
trading was less an issue, Britain relaxed its former concern about European
competition along this coast, while at the same time not forgetting the
importance of a direct path linking Freetown with Timbo and beyond.
Commodities arriving from the interior at Nunez and Pongo factories were
sufficient to satisfy British demands, although British traders increasingly
found themselves disadvantaged by unfavorable taxing policies respecting
commodities purchased in the Nunez and Pongo. This further increased
concerns that French traders from Gorée and Senegal bases were suc-
cessfully competing within these markets (Mouser 1971: chaps 4,5; Véné
1837: 1163-1182; D[agorne] 1830: 112-127; Goerg 1986: 23-58). As sup-
plies of commodities increased, British incomes from the trade increased,
however, as did that accruing to Senegalese agents present in the rivers.
For the time being, both could share in the rivers’ bounties41.
William Cooper Thomson’s 1841-1843 overland expedition from Free-
town to Timbo, with plans to proceed beyond it to Segu, came twenty years
after Dr. O’Beirne’s expedition in 1821 and was only partly government
funded, with a significant portion paid by private business interests in Sierra
Leone42. Part of the rationale for this expedition, although not stated, may
have involved an attempt to attract interior commodities directly to Freetown
where unfavorable tariffs levied on goods coming to Freetown by way of
the Northern Rivers would not apply. Lieutenant Governor Fergusson’s
letter to the Alimaami in 1841 specifically mentioned coffee, benny seeds,
and cotton as commodities in high demand at Freetown43. Thomson was
a likely candidate to lead such an expedition. Thomson was a linguist
attached to the Church Missionary Society and had gained some experience
in dealings with Loko and Temne near the Freetown settlement. His
expedition to Timbo was plagued by problems from the start, however.
With a Port Loko road to the interior closed in 1841, Thomson began his
venture through Melakori in Moria where he obtained permission to “use
the road” into the interior. To grant “title” to use a road and to become
41. Another consideration was the emergence of more stable paths along the so-called
north-south corridor of commerce. These were in the immediate hinterlands of
Sumbuya, Moria, Kukuna/Port Loko and the Rokel River. These paths were
divided into sections, however, each governed by separate ethnic/political
groups. A. HOWARD (1972: 140-160) documented the growth of these paths,
many having old roots but some new and responses to developing markets at
Freetown.
42. STANLEY (1846); CMS CA1/0/214, Papers of William Cooper Thomson [currently
being edited for publication by the author]; MCGOWAN (1978: 201-202);
DEVENEAUX (1978).
43. CMS CA1/M9/14, Lieut. Governor Fergusson to Alimamee Yah Yah King of
Teembo, 18 December 1841. That Abubakar was Alimaami was still unknown
at Freetown in late 1841.
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a sponsor for a caravan was the accepted procedure along this path, for it
formalized host/guest arrangements that generally were acceptable at each
segment along the way. Apparently Thomson injudiciously explained to
his host at Melakori, however, that his and Freetown’s ultimate objective
was to open a path all the way to Segu and that he intended to return via
Port Loko, not through Moria. His Morian hosts understandably withdrew
their permission, but Thomson began his expedition nonetheless. Effec-
tively Thomson’s expedition proceeded without a patron or host and without
protections that normally would have been carried by any traveler who
respected African practice along the path. Perhaps misled by his experien-
ces at Freetown, Thomson believed that he could negotiate each road seg-
ment separately and that somehow each agreement and segment would result
collectively in a complete path to Timbo. He did obtain agreements, but
none of them mattered because no significant leader along the path had the
power or interest to enforce their collectivity. His expedition took five
months of delay and negotiations before it reached Timbo in June 1842.
Thomson and his party remained as guests of Alimaami Abubakar at
his residence outside of Timbo until Thomson’s death on 26 November
1843. Thomson’s reports to his parent Church Missionary Society indicate
that he had arrived in Fuuta Jaloo at the beginning of civil unrest and that
Abubakar was unable or unwilling to commence full discussions with either
Thomson or Freetown, perhaps fearing that his council of advisors might
reject his recommendations and bring a crisis to the Fula state. These
reports clearly demonstrate, moreover, that Thomson’s presence, his topics
for discussion at Timbo, and his activities while there became embroiled
in the civil contest between Abubakar and his challenger and successor,
Omar44. Thomson vigorously championed Abubakar’s cause. By the time
44. The most descriptive report of Thomson’s activities is found in CMS CA1/0/214/
23, Thomson to Warburton, 19 January 1843. While at Timbo for more than
a year, Thomson had raised many issues that would have increased Fula
apprehensions about his and Freetown’s ultimate purpose in the interior. 1) An
open road to Freetown might involve Fula guarantees, a position that was oppo-
sed by many at Timbo because the traditional Fula method of enforcement was
through rapid strikes by their cavalry, a circumstance that would not be effective
in the rainforests that characterized the path to Port Loko. 2) Some at Timbo
and in other provincial capitals were concerned that a path between Timbo and
Freetown would increase Abubakar’s effective power by increasing his access
to weapons useful in maintaining control of the state. 3) Some questioned how
profits from the new road would be distributed within the state apparatus.
4) Thomson championed the release of a liberated African from Freetown who,
somehow, had become a slave in Fuuta Jaloo for more than fifteen years; discus-
sions over this issue lasted for the whole of Thomson’s residence at Timbo and
became a significant issue relating to the status of Fula slaves who might seek
asylum at Freetown, should a Fula caravan reach that port. 5) Thomson repea-
tedly requested meetings of Fula chiefs to discuss Freetown’s proposals at a time
when many Fula leaders preferred to minimize potential exposure should the
promised civil war between Abubakar and Omar commence. 6) Thomson’s
request to go beyond Timbo to Segu was one that antagonized many Fula who
wanted to restrict Freetown-based traders to only the Freetown-Timbo segment
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of Abubakar’s removal from power in March 1843, Thomson was convinced
that any discussions with Timbo authorities would be futile and that any
agreements reached, even after thorough negotiations, could not be enforced
(McGowan 1978: 206)45. In November 1844, the Reverend John U. Graf,
a Susu linguist and Church Missionary Society missionary at Freetown, sub-
mitted an analysis of commercial and missionary accessibility at Timbo and
in Freetown’s hinterland, conclusions based on his own observations and
those gleaned from Thomson’s letters. Graf reasoned that the Nunez path
was already secure and firmly controlled by merchants friendly to British
commerce. He dismissed southern paths to Timbo via Melakori, Kambia,
Kukuna and Port Loko as ever being fully controllable by Britain, suggest-
ing instead that alternative paths to Niger River commerce via the Rokel
River and by-passing more troublesome towns in the Scarcies-Fuuta Corri-
dor were then open. Indeed, interior “gold strangers” were reaching Free-
town in 1844, without going through Timbo at all. More importantly,
however, Graf warned about endless conversation at Timbo and suggested
that his own pessimistic analysis was shared by merchants and government
of this road. 7) Some in Timbo believed that Abubakar was less interested in
commerce than he was in obtaining an ally from Freetown to use against Omar.
8) Thomson was, according to his own account, conducting lively religious dis-
cussions with “learned” men in Fuuta Jaloo and was discussing the possibility
of establishing an English school at Timbo; according to Thomson, Abubakar
was willing to have such a school and welcomed religious instructors as well.
9) Thomson reported that he had discussed with Abubakar the possibility of his
conversion to Christianity. If Thomson were only half as argumentative in his
discussions as he was in his reports, many Fula would necessarily have inter-
preted him as a threat to the state and its religious stability and would have
questioned Abubakar’s continued reluctance to send Thomson back to Freetown.
For more on Buxtonian ideals prevalent at the time of Thomson’s expedition,
see HENNELL (1979: 24-26).
45. In January 1844, Edward Jones, from Freetown and representing the Church
Missionary Society, began an expedition to Timbo via the Rio Nunez, with the
expressed purpose to “make every attempt to procure correct information as to the
reported death of Mr. Thomson” and to retrieve his papers and his son, William or
Billy, who had accompanied Thomson on his 1841-43 expedition. Warfare in
the Nunez, however, blocked Jones’ expedition; he returned to Freetown after
learning that William, Jr., had returned to the coast by way of the Melakori
path. For the Jones expedition, see CMS CA1/0/129, “Papers, Reports, Journals
of Rev. E. Jones, 1841-64”. While at Boké in the Rio Nunez, Jones heard rumors
to the effect that on about 21 October 1843, Thomson had been summoned to
meet with the new Alimaami Omar. Later in the day, upon returning to his
house in Darah, Thomson became very ill and died soon thereafter. Rumors
suggested that Thomson had been poisoned. For these rumors, see CMS CA1/
0/129, Jones to Warburton, 16 January 1844. This account differed significantly
from that in CMS CA1/M11, Warburton to the Secretaries, 2 March 1844, which
indicated that Thomson died on 26 November 1843 after drinking warm milk
given to him by a trusted servant. Surgeon Fergusson of the Colony indicated
that, from the symptoms of his illness as described by his son who arrived after-
wards in the Colony, he believed that Thomson had been poisoned.
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officials in the Colony46. Assuming that Graf’s understanding of Freetown
attitudes was essentially correct, these conclusions and written reports effec-
tively poisoned future consideration for meaningful discussions between
Freetown and Timbo for decades to follow. During Omar’s reign period,
1843-1872, no official British representative visited the Fula capital.
Graf’s expedition in 1850 to Labaya country in the upper Konkouré
River, with plans to proceed from there to Sulima, was described as a
“missionary tour” and involved no funds granted by the colonial administra-
tion (Graf 1998)47. Clearly, by the mid-1840s, Freetown and its officials
became more concerned about maintaining and improving its colonial bases
and less in enforcing agreements designed to keep interior paths opera-
tional. As long as Fula and more distant traders or their products reached
the Freetown market, whether through the Northern Rivers, overland along
the occasionally-opened Timbo/Port Loko path, or via other means, Free-
town and its merchant community seemed satisfied.
*
Whatever preeminence that Britain may have enjoyed in Guinea-Conakry
and in the Fuuta Jaloo highlands before 1850 was flittered away by events
in the decade that followed. This paper has not focused on French interests
or concerns, but it is clear that French officials at Gorée and Saint Louis
were more interested in aggressive commercial and territorial expansion in
the “Rivières du Sud” and Fuuta Jaloo than were the British, especially
after Omar’s assumption to power in 1843. The French also were firm
supporters of those of its traders on the coast who found themselves in
conflicts with local landlords or with unclear commercial agreements and
graded anchorage or waterage duties imposed upon them by landlords. In
contrast, the British tended to take the position that traders should not expect
royal power to intervene directly to protect their individual economic inter-
ests or agreements with landlords. By the 1860s, British objectives had
been replaced by a forceful French presence in the rivers. Once the French
had secured the rivers and had reached agreements with local landlords, an
46. CMS CA1/M11, 415-421, “A Report on the Accessibility of the Interior of Africa
from the neighbourhood of Sierra Leone to para. 9 of the Parent Com’s letter
dated May 17, 1844”, by J. U. Graf. In this report, Graf addressed three ques-
tions: 1) Advantages that Thomson produced for Britain at Timbo? 2) Advan-
tages of using the Rio Nunez as a path into the interior? 3) Prospects of
establishing a CMS mission station at Timbo? Graf reasoned that all missionary
efforts at Timbo would fail.
47. GRAF (1998). It is clear from Church Missionary Records that Graf had planned
the tour to begin in 1843 or 1844 and to proceed as far as Falaba, but the Local
Committee in Freetown ordered his expedition postponed, partly in consequence
of the failures of the Thomson expedition. For Graf’s defense of an 1844 expedi-
tion, see CMS CA1/M11, J. U. Graf to Warburton, 19 February 1844: 253-254.
784 BRUCE L. MOUSER
open and secure British connection between Timbo and Freetown no longer
was a reasonable expectation. Understandings already in place between
Timbo and Freetown before 1850 quickly became irrelevant.
Professor Emeritus, Department of History, University of Wisconsin at La Crosse.
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ABSTRACT
Before the imposition of French rule over the coast of Guinea-Conakry and Fuuta
Jaloo in the second half of the nineteenth century, British traders and Britain itself had
considered this region to be within their spheres of influence and perhaps expected it
to become British territory, if it were to be absorbed by a European power. This
paper traces the activities of British investment interests from the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury and methods used to maintain dominance over competing ventures. It also
details official British governmental efforts to establish colonial posts along this coast
and direct linkages with leaders of Fuuta Jaloo to the mid-nineteenth century. What-
ever the consequences of these attempts, British officials were keenly aware of this
region’s importance to British commercial success in West Africa.
RÉSUMÉ
Préservation des intérêts britanniques en Guinée-Conakry et au Fouta-Djalon. —Bien
avant que la France imposa son contrôle sur la Côte de Guinée-Conakry et au Fouta-
Djalon dans la deuxième moitié du XIXe siècle, les commerçants britanniques et la
Grande-Bretagne considéraient que cette région faisait partie de leur sphère d’in-
fluence. Aussi s’attendaient-ils à ce qu’elle devînt territoire britannique si jamais elle
venait à être absorbée par une puissance européenne. Cet article décrit les activités
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et les intérêts britanniques dans la région à partir du XVIIIe siècle ainsi que les méthodes
utilisées par les Anglais pour maintenir leur domination sur leurs rivaux. Il détaille
également les efforts entrepris par le gouvernement britannique pour mettre en place
des postes coloniaux le long de cette côte et établir des liens directs avec les chefs
du Fouta-Djalon jusqu’au milieu du XIXe siècle. Quelles qu’aient été les conséquences
de leurs efforts, les représentants britanniques étaient pleinement conscients de l’im-
portance de cette région pour le succès commercial de leur pays en Afrique de
l’Ouest.
Keywords/Mots-clés: Sierra Leone, Fuuta Jaloo/Futa Jallon, Iles de Los, American com-
merce, British colonialism, British commerce, exploration, Fula Empire, slave trade/
Sierra Leone, Fouta-Djalon, Iles de Los, commerce américain, colonialisme britan-
nique, commerce britannique, exploration, empire Fula, commerce d’esclaves.
